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The word ‘Taliban’, in sharp contrast to the acts of the organization, means a ‘student’. The organization came to get this name from the fact that most of its recruits were from the madrasas or seminaries set up by the group’s organizers in Pakistan and around the region bordering Pakistan and Afghanistan. Not unexpectedly, Islamic religious texts were (and still are) a part of their curriculum, but the other (and equally important) part is the training how to handle a Kalashnikov. The groups which the US faces in the land between Pakistan and Afghanistan do not constitute a single well-knit organization. They can be described as a ‘syndicate’ under no single leader. This does not stand in the way of co-ordinated actions on their part though.
President Barack Obama must have found to his consternation the disastrous consequences of neglecting Afghanistan by concentrating wholly on Iraq (and its elusive Weapons of Mass Destruction) by predecessor George Bush. What a dazzling victory over the Taliban in 2001 had achieved was all but lost by that neglect of his predecessor. Taking full advantage of Bush’s obsession with Iraq the Taliban made a grand come-back in Afghanistan with secure bases on the Pak-Afghan border.
Rejuvenated Taliban
The local commanders of the five NATO countries, viz., the US, UK Denmark, Canada and Holland have discovered to their surprise (and horror) the fact of this Taliban resurgence. In September, 2006 the soldiers from these five countries mounted an attack, code named ‘Operation Medusa’ on the Taliban in Afghanistan. The operation convinced the NATO commanders of the extensive rejuvenation and war-preparedness of the Taliban.
Faced with this altered situation the NATO. Command in Afghanistan demanded more troops from their respective home countries. General McChrystal, the over-all NATO Commander in Afghanistan, also feels that a big enough reinforcement will send a strong signal of American commitment and enable him to wrest the initiative militarily. In conformity with the opinions of the NATO commanders President Obama has taken the decision to dispatch 30000 more men to the Afghanistan front.
Talk Of Rapprochement
But the talk everywhere is for rapprochement with the Taliban. The President is under strong pressure to define an exit policy in clear-cut terms. What was till the other day a taboo – talking to an enemy that had offered shelter to US’s arch-enemy Osama bin Laden and his band – is now becoming an acceptable proposition. That is the reason why Secretary of State Hillary Clinton could say recently that “the US is not interested in staying in Afghanistan. It has no long-term stake there”. Even the Generals are coming around to the view that fighting alone will not win this war. For quite a few US, European and UN diplomats, negotiation (with the Taliban) appears to be the only way to get out of the quagmire. Even the supreme NATO commander in Afghanistan General McChrystal’s assessment is that “NATO must identify opportunities to re-integrate former mid to low level insurgent fighters into normal society by offering them a way out”.
Lt. General Graeme Lamb, a former head of UK’s Special Forces, is of the opinion: “This is about entering a dialogue where they can see opportunities, because the way you counter an insurgency is with a better life”. The British Prime Minister Gordon Brown is more determined to carry on while America is being hesitant. Mr Brown has promised 500 more British soldiers on condition that the Afghan government itself deploys more troops and other NATO allies also step up their quota.
British Foreign Secretary. David Miliband also says that NATO must stay in Afghanistan to prevent the Taliban filling the vacuum. The American Ambassador in Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry is reported to have warned President Obama that strengthening the American presence in Afghanistan will not be helpful unless Hamid Karzai’s government shows willingness to fight corruption and other vices which are tarnishing its image among the Afghan populace. Both Afghan and US officials have, however, adopted the new terminology ‘re-integration’.
Re-integration Of Taliban
Hamid Karzai who has embarked on a second five-year term as president, maintains that his primary agenda is to bring the war in his country an end through negotiation with the members of the Taliban insurgency. The policy is one of re-integration with low-level Taliban members who are, it is presumed, fighting for money and reconciliation with its leaders who are motivated by ideology. This plan for re-integration and reconciliation is to be undertaken jointly with the Afghan Government.
Says a US diplomat: “We think that re-integration, if done right, if done by Afghan leaders and people, helps to create conditions for broader-scale reconciliation”. But even those who support this plan for reconciliation – President Obama himself is one of them – are worried about Hamid Karzai’s corruption-riddled government. Says Ishak Nizami, former head of TV and Radio Directorate when the Taliban had taken over Afghanistan; “There is so much corruption and no laws. Even if some fighters turn, they will turn back when they understand that their lives are not better”. Persuading the Taliban insurgents to lay down their arms will be a part of this new approach. But they need to feel safe if they do so. If they are to disarm, as the new US policy wants, they need to confident that they are joining the side which will win and stay. So far this policy has focused on the Taliban at the low level. But there have been moves to contact the leaders of the insurgency too.
Obama has, of late, had an enquiry made into the many provincial leaders in Afghanistan to ascertain with which of them the US could do business (of reconciliation). The enquiry did not avoid contacts with the Taliban commanders even. In fact, to many Americans on duty in Afghanistan, the Taliban commanders are no worse than the war lords who preceded them in the past. Quite a few of those war lords are now members of Hamid Karzai’s ministry. If such men can be brought in, why not the Taliban leadership, the current argument goes like that.
Islamic Government In Kabul
What prospects have these US moves towards reconciliation or reintegration with the Taliban? The Taliban leadership, not unexpectedly, has greeted all this with scorn: “The mujahedin of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan are not mercenaries”, said Mulla Akhund in a statement. “This war will come to an end when all invaders leave our country and an Islamic government is formed”. Recently Mullah Omar sent an internet message to Americans in which he turned down all talks of negotiation with the Americans or the Karzai Government.
At the end of his message Omar appealed to the entire Islamic community to join the jihad against America. He praised the mujahidin fighters in Iraq, Palestine and other countries fighting America. President Obama has sent 30000 US troops to Afghanistan, no doubt. But the ultimate policy is a policy of exit from Afghanistan, though the immediate aim is to hurt the Taliban so hard that reconciliation through surrender and /or negotiation seems the more prefereable to the Taliban leadership.
The impact of a return to mainstream (and to power) of the Taliban in Afghanistan will be felt both in Pakistan and in India. With no deep roots the US bolstered democratic set-up will disappear in no time. And its place will be taken up by the Taliban which has never evinced any love for democratic processes. The result will be Pakistan’s rapid progression on towards a more redicalised Islam, a more aggressive form of fundamentalism internally. This change-over to Talibanism will not be so very difficult, for there has always been a relationship of close co-operation there between the Pak military, including its Inter-Services Intelligence and the fundamentalist groups.
Adverse Effect Of Taliban Takeover Externally, a Taliban take-over of Afghanistan and Pakistan will affect India very adversely. Between India and Afghanistan the political-diplomatic relationship was always on a mutually beneficial basis from King Amanullah Khan’s time to the regime of the Communist President Dr. Najibullah (who was murdered by the Taliban). Upon its defeat in 2001 of the Taliban by the USA India’s influence in Afghanistan has been growing again. With Taliban’s return this influence will be done away with. This is one adverse effect.
Talibanisation Of Pakistan
Other effects are more serious for India’s security. The impact of Taliban take-over will be to push Pakistan wholesale into a jihadi regime. At the best of time the leitmotif of Pakistan has been hatred and animosity to India. It will be more open and intense with a Taliban victory. For all talk of ‘reconciliation’ notwithstanding, the actuality will be a victorious return of the Taliban with the exit of US forces.
The new Taliban-led administration of Pakistan will be itching for a confrontation with India. The two terrorists organizations, Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad will come to the fore with their forecious anti-India programmes. The Lashkar-e-Toiba which was set up by Hafiz Saeed in 1990, will feel emboldened by the exit of Amefica from the region to execute its present goal of ‘liberating’ Kashmir: it will look upon the ‘liberation’ of all Muslims in India as the next step in its programme, for bringing back the Muslim raj in the whole of India is a part of its dream.
Hundreds of Lashkar-e-Toiba centres under the guise of madrasas or academies are operating openly across Pakistan. Similar centres under the guise of academies have opened up in India under the aegis of the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) where apart from Islamic religious texts virulent anti-Hindu thinking is promoted along with training in arms. It will not be surprising if the Muslims in India have also begun to dreams this dream of bringing back the Muslim regime which, they are made to believe, had been usurped by Lord Clive at the Battle of Plassey.
Jinnah’s Flawed Partition
(Incidentally, it may be observed that though the creation of Pakistan was an achievement by Mr MA Jinnah it suffered from two drawbacks or defects from the beginning viz., first the Partition did not include all Muslims in India and not just those in a few provinces; and, on the face of it, the principle of Partition of Mr Jinnah was not the ‘Two Nation Theory’ but territorial. Else it would have provided for an exchange of population and not have left out the second biggest – after Indonesia – number of Muslims within the Indian Union and that is the second defect of the Jinnah Partition plan). The thousands of young Muslims in India who are being groomed in the Lashkar-e-Toiba’s surrogate the SIMI’s madrasas, will act as the second front for Taliban dominated Pakistan if and when – the likelihood is great really – the current low intensity proxy war between Pakistan and India escalates into an open armed confrontation.